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Abstract 
 
 
Ownership is the essence of economic citizenship. Beyond actual possession, a 
sense of personal welfare and proprietorship, or at least the hope of achieving 
them, constitute a necessary and important complement to being stakeholders in 
a society. Together with efficacy and legitimacy, these are necessary attributes 
of political agency. In this chapter we examine the interplay between democra-
cy, social opportunity and economic security, drawing upon survey data to ex-
plore popular perceptions of India’s new economic policy. The article first situ-
ates itself within the context of new theoretical literature on the multi-
dimensional nature of poverty and how to measure it, then identifies aggregate 
indicators of the performance of Indian states and the overall achievements and 
failings of India in terms of poverty alleviation. In the second half, the article 
identifies what seems to be the lack of a ‘politics of poverty’ in India and the 
various cultural, historical, political explanations that have been proffered for 
this apparent anomaly. Finally, the impact of democracy on poverty reduction is 
examined through the programmes that have been launched and which aim at 
creating a level-playing field, but which nevertheless have the potential to de-
generate into highly populist measures. 
  
  
Students of poverty measurement and alleviation find contemporary India 
puzzling. The economy thrives yet poverty persists. This sends mixed signals. 
As for the former, enthusiastic supporters of neo-liberal economic policies find 
in India a suitable context for the enthusiastic endorsement of liberalisation. On 
the other hand, persistent poverty – the dark under-belly of India’s thriving cor-
porate sector – is exactly the cue that India’s radical Left needs to unleash a bar-
rage of anti-colonial, anti-liberalisation and anti-capitalist policies. In this paper, 
we take a middle position between the radical rejection of India’s past, and its 
mechanical acceptance. Instead we argue that it is politics that provides the link-
age between poverty, democracy and social policies. 
 
In terms of absolute numbers, India, it is often pointed out has more poor 
people than any other country. This is true on every count, no matter the method 
of measurement applied. Furthermore, India’s high levels of poverty have per-
sisted despite more than a half-century of policies and rhetoric promising to 
eradicate mass poverty. In his inaugural speech at Independence in 1947, Ja-
waharlal Nehru endorsed Mahatma Gandhi’s goal of removing “every tear from 
every eye.” For much of the period since Independence, government policy 
sought to reduce poverty by constraining the freedom of the private sector. Poor 
farmers were strongly encouraged to form cooperatives. The state intervened to 
dictate which sections of the industrial sector were to be reserved for small and 
micro or ‘cottage’ industries. While policies and debates since the 1950s have 
seen reversals and re-evaluations, committee reports2 and institutional innova-
tions, the question of how best to tackle and alleviate poverty remains to a large 
extent, elusive.   
 
Furthermore, the issue of mass poverty brings to the fore the core challenge 
for India’s political economy, how to balance economic growth with redistribu-
tion. Scholarly opinion remains divided. Many critics of the Indian model of 
development consider the continued existence of mass poverty as evidence of 
the shortcomings of Indian democracy and its political economy of develop-
ment. Others point in the direction of relative improvements in India’s infra-
structure, GDP, rate of growth, improved trade figures as signs of progress. In 
theoretical and methodological terms, mass poverty raises issues of incredible 
complexity, pitting quantitative methods against the qualitative and problems of 
politics and public policy versus moral issues of poverty amidst increasing dis-
plays of prosperity and plenty.  Some core questions that are going to be raised 
in this article include, how can poverty be measured? Is a cross-cultural, objec-
tive measure of poverty possible? Is poverty merely the lack of money or is it a 
‘state of mind’? Is poverty necessarily culture and context-specific? Why does 
mass poverty co-exist with spectacular growth in India? Is liberalization ‘good’ 
for the poor? What has the government done, or is doing for poverty alleviation? 
 
 
 
 
Conceptualizing and measuring poverty 
 
What is poverty? A renowned glossary on poverty identifies twelve distinct 
definitions.3 Poverty as a material concept: (1) Need constituted by lack of mate-
rial goods and services – such as basic human needs like save drinking water, 
food, shelter, sanitation, health, education or information.4 (2) Patterns of depri-
vation taking into account the combinations, seriousness and duration of depri-
vations. (3) Limited command over resources as every need is a need for some-
thing. Poverty as economic circumstances: (4) Standard of living measured as 
income or consumption. (5) Inequality as an intrinsic conceptual part of poverty 
when poverty is linked to a minimum standard of living tolerable in a society. 
(6) Economic position in society, abstracted as “class” and reflecting the ine-
quality of a social structure. Poverty as social circumstances: (7) Social class 
attaching a socio-economic status to an economic position in society – e.g. “un-
derclass” or in the Indian context “low castes” or “untouchables”. (8) Depend-
ency mainly conceptualised in the relationship towards the state as following 
from being dependent on social benefits. (9) Lack of basic security leading to 
vulnerability to social risks. (10) Lack of entitlement as the underlying reason for 
lack of resources. (11) Exclusion from the “minimum acceptable way of life” 
due to limitations in material, social and cultural resources.5 (12) Poverty as 
moral judgement: pointing to the element of unacceptable hardship of poverty, 
implying that something ought to be done about it. 
 
Poverty is, however, multidimensional. Decisive in the acknowledgement of 
the multiple dimensions of poverty has been the human development approach 
spearheaded by the UNDP. Ever since the launching of the human development 
index in 1990 by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, which aimed at putting 
health and education in addition to income at the centre of poverty conceptuali-
sation, more dimensions of poverty have been acknowledged as essential. A 
milestone in the multidimensional conceptualisation of poverty has been Jean 
Drèze’s and Amartya Sen’s (1989) notion of poverty as a lack of entitlement, 
pointing out that a lack of essential resources echoes a lack of entitlements.6 Or 
in other words it is not the lack of food that produces famines but the inability of 
people to buy existing food, it is not the lack of housing that constitutes home-
lessness but the lack of access to housing. Developing this idea further, Sen’s 
capability approach defines development as the expansion of peoples’ individual 
freedoms and their overall capability to enjoy a life they have reason to value. 
One of the central contributions of the capability approach has been that it draws 
attention to the importance of agency and freedom of choice. Sen argues: “With 
adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own desti-
ny and help each other. They need not to be seen primarily as passive recipients 
of the benefits of cunning development programmes. There is indeed a strong 
  
  
rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and 
even of constructive impatience.” 7 
 
This leads to the question of how poverty can be measured. The most per-
vasive international measures, the poverty lines set by the World Bank are $1.25 
and $2 using 2005 purchasing-power parity (PPP). These poverty lines refer to 
an underlying definition of poverty as “the inability to attain a minimal standard 
of living”.8 Such an absolute measure of living standard, usually measured as 
income or consumption, defines a specific and, to a certain extent arbitrary, 
threshold under which one is regarded as being poor. It has to be distinguished 
from a relative standard of living in a society, which conveys inequality, and 
which is the common way to conceptualise and measure poverty in advanced 
economies (e.g. poverty line at 60% of average household income). The beauty 
of attaining a single, allegedly precise number of poor people brings with it a 
high price. First, it defines the standard of living narrowly in terms of income, 
not taking into account other central aspects like life expectancy or access and 
quality of health care and education. Second, non-monetary income and income 
transfers like free or subsidized public services do not feature due to data limita-
tions. Third, the way income is adjusted for household size and type is rather 
arbitrary. Fourth, the differences in cost-of-living between different regions and 
social groups are not captured appropriately.9 Fifth, inequality within the house-
hold is usually not captured. To gain a more comprehensive and instructive un-
derstanding of poverty, it seems inevitable that there is a need to look into fur-
ther dimensions beyond income or consumption. 
 
An innovative measurement, the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) was 
recently launched in the 20th anniversary Human Development Report.10 The 
MPI assesses the “nature and intensity of poverty at the individual level”.11 The 
MPI goes beyond a mere headcount of poor people and identifies the depth of 
poverty, meaning the intensity of deprivation across different dimensions of 
poverty. So far the MPI takes into account three dimensions: (1) health, meas-
ured as nutrition and child mortality; (2) education with the indicators being 
years of schooling and children enrolled and, (3) standard of living, comprising 
electricity, drinking water, sanitation, type of floor, cooking fuel and assets. 
However, Alkire and Santos suggest going further. “Missing dimensions”, such 
as quality of work, physical safety, empowerment, psychological well-being as 
well as the ability ‘to go about without shame’ could be integrated into the 
MPI.12 One core feature of the MPI is that it enables the black box of “poverty” 
to be opened as findings can be analysed according to indicators (e.g. how much 
the indicators of sanitation or cooking fuel contribute to overall poverty), by 
groups of the population (e.g. in what dimensions groups like scheduled castes 
experience more or less deprivation, and to what intensity) and by regions (e.g. 
 
 
which states or even regions within states are exposed to what kind and what 
intensity of poverty). 
 
The following two tables serve to compare the status of poverty in India in 
relation to its regional neighbours (Bangladesh and Pakistan) as well as its inter-
national peers classified through the BRICS nomenclature. Table 6.1. shows the 
broad range of people classified as poor depending on which method of meas-
urement is applied. In the case of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, the percentage 
of people classified as poor under the MPI is situated in between the two poverty 
lines proposed by the World Bank (1,25$ and 2$ a day), ranging from 51% to 
58%. For China and South Africa however, the MPI identifies less people as 
poor compared to both World Bank poverty lines, at the level of 13% for China 
and 3% for South Africa.  
 
According to World Bank´s US$ 1.25 and US$ 2 poverty lines as well as to 
the MPI proportion of poor (in other words the headcount H) the ranking regard-
ing the percentage of people living in poverty is as follows: Bangladesh having 
the highest percentage of poor, followed by India and then Pakistan. This is not 
so when using the national poverty lines, as defined by the states themselves, 
according to which there are some percentage less poor people in India than in 
Pakistan. Looking at the MPI (last column in table 6.1.) one finds that India has 
the worst performance among the three South Asian states. This is due to the 
way the MPI is computed: it takes into account the average intensity of depriva-
tion (A) and multiplies it with the proportion of poor (H).13 The average intensi-
ty of deprivation “reflects the proportion of dimensions in which households are, 
on average, deprived”.14 The dimensions being health, education and standard of 
living with the (so far) 10 indicators, introduced above. On average, poor house-
holds in India are deprived across more dimensions than in Bangladesh, whereas 
Pakistan has an even slightly higher average intensity of deprivation than India 
(see second last column in table 6.1.). Due to this higher average intensity of 
deprivation in India (despite having some percentage less poor people than 
Bangladesh), India performs slightly less well than Bangladesh concerning the 
measurement by the MPI. 
 
In Table 6.2. the three dimensions of education, health and living standards 
are showcased, comparing their indicators among the selected countries. This 
decomposition allows for a far more comprehensive policy advice since it high-
lights shortcomings in specific areas. For example, in the regional context of 
South Asia, Bangladesh outperforms India and Pakistan concerning the enrol-
ment of children whereas Pakistan is far better in providing electricity to its citi-
zens. Given the weights of the different indicators the biggest contributor to 
multidimensional poverty in India is the health sector with inadequate nutrition 
contributing disproportionately. Within the living standard dimension cooking 
  
  
fuel and sanitation can be pinpointed as major contributors to multidimensional 
poverty in India.  
 
Applying the MPI raises several interesting insights. First, the huge varia-
tion in multidimensional poverty between the Indian states, ranges from 16% 
being poor in Kerala, 32% in Tamil Nadu, 58% in West Bengal to 81% in Bihar 
(see Table 6.3.). Second, decomposition along social classes confirms the com-
mon impression that marginalised social groups are disproportionately affected 
by poverty. For example, 81.4% of Scheduled Tribes, 65.8% of Scheduled 
Castes and 58.3% of Other Backward Classes in India are classified as poor by 
the MPI.15 A special feature of the MPI is that it highlights the fact that poverty 
needs to be examined both in terms of its spread as well as its depth. As seen in 
Table 6.3. the average intensity of poverty, in other words the seriousness of 
deprivation along the different dimensions, tends to rise in those states with a 
greater proportion of people living in poverty.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Comparison of Poverty Lines & MPI – BRICS plus Pakistan and Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Values have been rounded. 
b) Survey Data for India: DHS 2005. 
c) Survey Data for Bangladesh and Pakistan: DHS 2007. 
d) Survey Data for China, Brazil, South Africa and Russia: WHS 2003. 
 
Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), Country Briefing –  
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, China, Brazil South Africa, Russia, 2010 & Human Development Report, 2010. 
 Comparative Poverty Measures Poverty 
Depth 
Index 
 US$ 1.25  
a day 
US$ 2    
a day 
National 
Poverty 
Line 
MPI – Pro-
portion of 
Poor (H) a) 
MPI – Aver-
age Intensity 
(A) 
MPI         
(= H x A) 
India b) 42 % 76 % 29 % 55 % 53.5 % 0.296 
Bangladesh c) 50 % 81 % 40 % 58 % 50.4 % 0.291 
Pakistan 23 % 60 % 33 % 51 % 54.0 % 0.275 
China d) 16 % 36 % 3 % 13 % 44.9 % 0.056 
Brazil 5 % 13 % 22 % 9 % 46.0 % 0.039 
South Africa 26 % 43 % 22 % 3 % 46.7 % 0.014 
Russia 2 % 2 % 20 % 1 % 38.9 % 0.005 
  
  
Table 6.2. MPI Deprivation for each Sector – BRICS plus Pakistan and Bangladesh 
 
 
 
a) Values have been rounded. 
 
Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), Country Briefing –  
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, China, Brazil South Africa, Russia, 2010.
States Education a) Health a) Living Standard a) 
  Schooling Enrolment 
(Children) 
Mortality 
(Children) 
Nutrition Electricity Sanitation Drinking 
Water 
Floor Cook-
ing Fuel 
Assets 
India 18 % 25 % 23 % 39 % 29 % 49 % 12 % 40 % 52 % 38 % 
Bangladesh 24 % 9 % 24 % 37 % 39 % 48 % 2 % 54 % 57 % 45 % 
Pakistan 19 % 34 % 30 % N/A 9 % 33 % 8 % 36 % 42 % 26 % 
China 11 % 0 % 0 % 3 % 0 % 8 % 3 % 3 % 9 % 2 % 
Brazil 8 % 0 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 4 % 2 % 2 % 7 % 0 % 
South Africa 3 % 0 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 2 % 1 % 1 % 2 % 1 % 
Russia 1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 1 % 
 
 
Table 6.3. Decomposition of Multidimensional Poverty across Indian States 
 
MPI 
Rank 
States Population 
(millions) 
2007 
Number              
of MPI 
Poor 
(millions) 
Proportion 
of Poor (H) 
Average 
Intensity 
(A) 
MPI            
(HxA) 
1 Kerala 35.0 5.6 15.9 % 40.9 % 0.065 
2 Goa 1.6 0.4 21.7 % 43.4 % 0.094 
3 Punjab 27.1 7.1 26.2 % 46.0 % 0.120 
4 Himachal Pradesh 6.7 2.1 31.0 % 42.3 % 0.131 
5 Tamil Nadu 68.0 22.0 32.4 % 43.6 % 0.141 
6 Uttaranchal 9.6 3.9 40.3 % 46.9 % 0.189 
7 Maharashtra 108.7 43.6 40.1 % 48.1 % 0.193 
8 Haryana 24.1 10.0 41.6 % 47.9 % 0.199 
9 Gujarat 57.3 23.8 41.5 % 49.2 % 0.205 
10 Jammu & Kashmir 12.2 5.4 43.8 % 47.7 % 0.209 
11 Andhra Pradesh 83.9 37.5 44.7 % 47.1 % 0.211 
12 Karnataka 58.6 27.0 46.1 % 48.3 % 0.223 
13 Eastern Ind. States 44.2 25.5 57.6 % 52.5 % 0.303 
14 West Bengal 89.5 52.2 58.3 % 54.3 % 0.317 
15 Orissa 40.7 26.0 64.0 % 54.0 % 0.345 
16 Rajasthan 65.4 41.9 64.2 % 54.7 % 0.351 
17 Uttar Pradesh 192.6 134.7 69.9 % 55.2 % 0.386 
18 Chhattisgarh 23.9 17.2 71.9 % 53.9 % 0.387 
19 Madhya Pradesh 70.0 48.6 69.5 % 56.0 % 0.389 
20 Jharkhand 30.5 23.5 77.0 % 60.2 % 0.463 
21 Bihar 95.0 77.3 81.4 % 61.3 % 0.499 
 India 1,164.7 645.0 55.4 % 53.5 % 0.296 
 
Source: Based on Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), 
Country Briefing India, 2010.  
  
  
Mass poverty, growth versus redistribution: 
The dilemma of development in Post-Colonial States 
revisited16
 
 
A number of early books on the subject of India’s potential for political and 
economic development were pessimistic about the ability to maintain democratic 
institutions while enabling mass mobilization and delivering governance and 
development. Barrington Moore for instance was highly negative about the Indi-
an model, attributing poor performance to a dysfunctional ‘trickle-down, felt-
needs’ model. Democracy in Moore’s eyes simply complicated the matter. In his 
words, ‘Only one line of policy that seems to offer real hope, which, to repeat, 
implies no prediction that it will be the one adopted. In any case, a strong ele-
ment of coercion remains necessary if a change is to be made. Barring some 
technical miracle that will enable every Indian peasant to grow abundant food in 
a glass of water or a bowl of sand, labor will have to be applied much more ef-
fectively, technical advances introduced, and means found to get food to the 
dwellers in the cities. Either masked coercion on a massive scale, as in the capi-
talist model including even Japan, or more direct coercion approaching the so-
cialist model will remain necessary. The tragic fact of the matter is that the poor 
bear the heaviest costs of modernization under both socialist and capitalist aus-
pices (emphasis added).17 
 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Dandekar and Rath in Poverty in 
India (1971) who, at the peak of the period of the populist counterattack, sug-
gested that poverty alleviation needed higher taxation and employment genera-
tion through public works. The same moral imperative seems to have been at 
work in the concepts of entitlement made famous by Amartya Sen. Going 
against widespread scholarship on the link between economic growth and pov-
erty, Sen and Drèze pinpointed the low levels of social indicators in India as the 
pre-eminent determinant of the country’s poor performance in the past, advocat-
ing that the state needs to contribute to a people-centred economic development 
aimed at the expansion of human capabilities.18 
 
Examining and contrasting development across Indian states, Atul Kohli has 
pointed out that while rates of economic growth might predict where poverty is 
likely to come down, the same unit of economic growth has drastically different 
effects from state to state. Hence, one unit of growth in Kerala or West Bengal 
has been four times more ‘efficient’ in reducing levels of poverty than for exam-
ples in Bihar or Madhya Pradesh. Rather than examine aspects like irrigation 
infrastructure, enhanced farm yields, access to credit which Kohli regards as 
proximate determinants, he points to the form of social and political power as an 
 
 
answer. As a hypothesis therefore, Kohli has proposed that poverty comes down 
the fastest in those states were effective governmental power has been founded 
upon a broad political base, where the hold of upper classes have been mini-
mised, middle and lower classes have successfully organised and used these 
resources to reach the power. Democracy may indeed have enabled the Indian 
state to be a more responsive state but even coupled with higher growth rates, 
during the 1990s and 2000s, has not led to dramatic reductions in poverty. This 
leads Kohli to propose that the fault lies in “the state’s limited institutional ca-
pacities and faulty policies at the central, state and local levels”.19 
 
Kaushik Basu has countered this position by arguing that bureaucracy and 
governmental overactivity have in fact fettered the Indian economy.20 Basu goes 
as far as to say that bureaucratic control emanates from the particular nature of 
India’s democracy which is ‘a system of overlapping rights’ where every one 
has the right to decide on every matter as opposed to a system of ‘partitioned 
rights’ where everyone has a domain over which she or he has the full right to 
decide. As a result, Indian-type democracy allows for conditions where many 
can exercise veto power, impairing policy design, flexibility and critically, im-
plementation. 
 
As a country where most of the population lives in villages and depends on 
agricultural for their livelihood, one of the greatest challenges to the Indian state 
has been agrarian modernization. In fact, it is estimated that more than three 
fourths of India’s poor live in its villages. Here again, extensive critiques have 
been mounted against Indian policy makers and their failure to allocate enough 
attention, funds and resources to this sector, mesmerized as they were by pro-
jects of steel plant and dam-construction in the 1950s, establishing the country’s 
‘temples of modernity’ as Jawaharlal Nehru once famously put it. Agrarian 
modernization it can be argued requires a deep paradigm shift involving both a 
structural and cultural change.  
 
 
The perception of the ‘poor’ in Indian culture and 
history: poverty as karma?
 
Poverty in India is a socially meaningful concept although it lacks powerful 
political articulation. One explanation for this puzzle draws upon the power of 
religion and the construction of the self in India. May Weber for instance shows 
how the overall hegemony of the upper castes and their values provides a hege-
monic structure where the caste system functions as a transmission belt, siphon-
ing off economic creativity and political resentment into investments in spiritu-
ality, intended only to reinforce the power and dominance of the Hindu social 
structure.21 Furthermore, in his 1904 Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
  
  
ism, Weber was certain that Asia was doomed to centuries of economic stagna-
tion because of the entrenched structural and ideational incompatibilities be-
tween all the great philosophies of the East (Hinduism, Buddhism and Confu-
cianism) with the requirements of modern economic rationality. This therefore 
could be used as an explanation for why the poor have never been a national 
political force in India. Both the Naxalites in 1960s Bengal and the ‘Garibi 
Hatao’ (Remove Poverty) rhetoric of Indira Gandhi failed to take-off as a na-
tion-wide mass movement.  
 
However, Weber’s privileging of culture as the determinant of human ac-
tion, and his privileging of the Calvinist ethos as giving rise to a distinctive be-
haviour that was both rationalized and puritan, has met with a wide range of 
criticism. Not least, is the charge that Weber’s model of causality is unable to 
explain why and how cultural attitudes change or persist over time as underlying 
conditions alter. Furthermore, it has been proposed that such an interpretation is 
misleading as it assumes a highly compartmentalized approach to behaviour, 
assuming that the actor chooses his/her actions one at a time and is able to assess 
the rationality of each move. Instead it is argued that action is embedded within 
wider strategies or ‘assemblages’ of action and that ‘culture’ is to be seen not as 
an endogenous but rather an independent variable. Hence, the focus and empha-
sis shift away from the end goals that a culture may or may not prioritize to the 
context that has produced a certain ‘cultural tool-kit’.  
 
 
Contextualising the debate: how did India’s poor get 
into the political radar screen?
 
A historical explanation for what can be described as the ‘absence of the 
politics of poverty’ is provided by Barrington Moore. He formulates an answer 
with reference to the historic roles of British rule, Gandhi and the Congress par-
ty. The departure of the British deprived the Congress of their legitimate basis 
for a ‘unite to oppose’ strategy and the democratic empowerment of the socially 
marginal groups made the demand for both growth and redistribution all the 
more articulate as regular, competitive and largely fair elections became a nor-
mal part of politics. Interestingly, even the Karachi Resolution of 1931, consid-
ered to be the first major statement of the Indian National Congress on social 
and economic policy, and the pet project of Jawaharlal Nehru, contains no ex-
plicit reference to the problem of endemic poverty. Furthermore, though the 
more radical presidents of the INC prior to independence, such as Nehru in 
Faizpur and Subhas Chandra Bose in Haripura made references to poverty in 
their presidential addresses, little emerged in the form of resolutions or policy 
agendas. As a result, although by the mid-1950s there was a seeming consensus 
on the direction towards a ‘socialistic pattern of society’22, little agreement had 
 
 
been reached on the methods and mechanisms of targeting and alleviating pov-
erty, leaving the field open to wild swings between the rhetoric of the left and 
right as represented within the catch-all umbrella of the Congress. The following 
brief sketch of development discussions and policies within India captures the 
oscillations. 
 
 
Table 6.4. Development discussions and policies in India 
 
 
Period 
 
Environment surrounding 
policy discussion.  
 
Policy decisions /  
directions 
1947 – 51  Policy debate within Congress 
party and in the Constituent 
Assembly à  
‘Socialistic Pattern of Society’. 
Nehru’s mixed economy 
emerges victorious over 
Gandhian ideas about Com-
munity Development. 
1952 – 63 Planning emerges as the prima-
ry tool of government policy 
formulation and implementa-
tion. Political control over re-
sources, import-substitution, 
public sector, industry as lead-
ing sectors: ‘the commanding 
heights of the economy’. 
Public Distribution System 
as a mechanism for provid-
ing price support to produc-
ers and providing food sub-
sidy for consumers. 
1963 – 69 The policy debate is revived, 
and institutional reforms re-
emerge. 
Green Revolution and indi-
cations of a shift towards the 
right. 
1969 – 73 The populist comeback and 
counterattack. 
 
Land Reforms, Price Policy 
Reforms, Nationalization of 
Commercial Banks and Ad-
ministrative reforms. 
1974 – 84 Surreptitious and incremental 
liberalization. 
 
Direct action privileged: 
launching of Integrated Ru-
ral Development Program. 
1985 – 91 Half – hearted liberalization or 
‘liberalisation by stealth’. 
 
Innovations such as induc-
tion of elected village pan-
chayats in financing, plan-
ning & implementation 
functions & the creation of 
Self-Help Groups as recipi-
ents of mico-loans. 
1991 – 
2004 
Towards ‘non-reversible’ liber-
alization. 
New paradigm of ‘growth 
taking care of distribution’. 
  
  
2005 –  The ‘India Shining’ reality 
check. 
National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act. 
 
 
By the mid-1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru’s model, the ‘socialistic pattern of so-
ciety’ had gained precedence. The Socialist goal was to be attained through 
measures such as land reform. However, this early momentum soon met its 
roadblock in the form of rural landlords who were important kingmakers in local 
party politics.23 As a result, it has been documented by various scholars that land 
reform remained mostly as rhetoric, making little headway in terms of actual 
implementation. It has also been pointed out that there was simply a dearth of 
land available for distribution to the landless.24 India’s Five-Year Plans directed 
public funds towards private enterprise, infrastructure building, not employment 
generation. Egalitarian measures such as land reform eventually gave way to 
more populist and direct measures of poverty alleviation that at the same time 
did not involve confronting the landed elite. This was done through government 
subsidies, preferential credit in the form of programmes such as the Small Farm-
ers’ Development Agency (SFDA) programme (1971-79), the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (IRDP) (1979-99), the Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar 
Yojana (SGSY) (1999).  
 
Nehru’s model of import substitution, industrialization, modernization of 
agriculture, planning, was a model based on the ‘felt needs, trickle-down theo-
ry’. During the first three five-year plans over the years, 1951 – 1966, the prime 
emphasis was placed on the need to achieve higher growth rates in the belief that 
capital accumulation and enhanced savings/ investment would create a ‘trickle-
down’ effect of growth. However, the plans were over-ambitious, misguided and 
quickly ran into bottlenecks, particularly during the third plan when inflation, 
war with Pakistan, drought created massive dissatisfaction. By the late 1960s the 
land situation had become polarized. Bullock capitalists on the one side and rad-
icalized peasantry on the other, were both contributing to an environment of 
hostility and resentment, that many thought would be ripe for a Maoist revolu-
tion. The split in the Communist Party of India, giving birth to the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist), rise of Naxalite violence and political instability in 
many Indian States, indicated deep, inherent problems within the Indian model 
of development although the much-heralded revolution did not materialise.  
 
What followed the radical sixties was a spate of reformist legislation, na-
tionalization and some conspicuous programmes for instance, the Twenty Point 
Programme, land to the landless, homestead land, target group programmes - 
measures that were introduced by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the 
eighteenth month of the Emergency. Many of these social-democratic policies 
were put on hold when the Janata party came to power after the end of Emer-
 
 
gency and the fall of Indira Gandhi. However, the general tendency towards 
direct action programmes continues for instance through the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (IRDP) which aimed at providing assets to the asset-
less (small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers, rural artisans) through 
income-generating activities. During the 1980s this scheme was extended to 
cover schedule castes and tribes, women and rural artisan. Various structural 
problems plagued the IRDP. For instance, unskilled landless labourers were of-
fered credit to develop entrepreneurship without being provided the experience 
to manage and enterprise as a result of which banks were disinterested in provid-
ing credits to the poor. Recognising the failings of the IRDP, the government 
launched Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) in 1999 that aimed at 
creating ‘self-help groups’ rather than focusing on individuals in the bid to de-
velop micro-enterprises. The strengths of such an approach included the linking 
with existing banking institutions, providing banks also with the opportunity to 
penetrate into rural areas.  
 
Wage employment programmes have aimed at providing rural poor with a 
livelihood during a lean agricultural season as well during drought and floods. 
Continuing into the post-1991 reform era, these programmes have been revised 
and re-launched. For instance, a new emphasis has been placed on the need to 
create economic assets and infrastructure for villages with the idea that the crea-
tion of employment will follow as a by-product. The Public Distribution System 
(PDS) has been modified as a result of which it adopts a much more targeted 
approach, identifying households below the poverty line and providing them 
with subsidised food grains. A number of problems have dogged the PDS in-
cluding costing challenges, wastage, pilferage and diversion to the open market 
that occurs at different stages from procurement to distribution. 
 
Purchasing power of rural people was a major hurdle to poverty alleviation 
programmes such as the PDS where people were simply unable to purchase the 
grains even at subsidised prices. In response to this, the government’s National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, enacted by legislation on August 25, 2005 
sought to ameliorate the problem of purchasing power by providing a legal 
guarantee for one hundred days of employment in every financial year to adult 
members of any rural household. As the various programmes briefly outlined 
above, have demonstrated the government has faced a whole host of structural 
and technical problems. What has however, emerged centre stage also in terms 
of government-formulated programmes is a focus on the political and social 
dimensions of poverty. Hence the attention given to Panchayati Raj Institutions 
(PRI) and the function they can play in financing, planning and implementation 
of poverty-alleviation schemes. Moving away from the emphasis on income or 
entrepreneurship is the understanding that economic, social and political aspects 
of poverty alleviation are interlinked to one another. Hence economic upliftment 
  
  
alone cannot alleviate poverty but must also be connected to social and political 
empowerment. 
 
 
Democracy, Social Opportunity and  
Economic Security in India.
 
Does democracy give rise to both social opportunity and economic security? 
How successful has the Indian state been in reconciling the twin goals of remov-
ing mass poverty, extending economic democracy and at the same time main-
taining democratic and political competition? 
 
The record remains a highly disputed area of discussion. Even writers like 
Rajni Kothari and Morris-Jones, originally convinced that the flexibility of In-
dia’s political institutions would deliver, seem less sure in later works. Scholars 
like Atul Kohli have used regime as a variable to identify minor gains in egali-
tarianism.25 Hence, an interventionist state, backed up by a leftist coalition has 
been seen as undertaking effective anti-poverty mechanisms. Alternative inter-
pretations include the Rudolphs who highlight the role of demand groups and 
state-dominated pluralism. Mitra, on the other hand focuses on two-track strate-
gies where popular protest is as much part of ‘normal’ politics in India as is par-
ticipation.26 The state, in fact manages to draw upon protests as a means through 
which it can legitimise its authority by creating new institutions, responding to 
local demands and recruiting protestors into the political arena. Mitra has de-
picted this dynamic in the form of a new-institutional model that focuses on elite 
strategies in the form of institutional reforms, law and order management or 
constitutional adjustments (see below for the neo-institutional model).27 
 
 
Conclusion: The neo-institutional model
 
 
The poor have neither disappeared nor formed themselves into a political 
party or movement, but they continue to exist as a demand group whose pres-
ence is a brake on rapid and radical liberalization. However, as the flow diagram 
below demonstrates, India has found a mechanism of coping. Critical room to 
manoeuvre is provided through the constitution and the self-reinforcing dynamic 
of a system based on political accountability makes it necessary for elites to en-
gage in purposeful social intervention. As a result, institutional reforms and pol-
icy change can in fact add to stability rather than undermine it. Hence, the re-
sponse of decision-making elites to challenges take the form of law and order 
  
 
management, strategic reform and redistributive policies and constitutional 
change which are likely to affect the perception of local actors. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. A dynamic neo-institutional model of governance based on elite strate-
gies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mitra, Subrata K., The Puzzle of India’s Governance: Culture, Context 
and Comparative Theory, London: Routledge, 2006. 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, Ashutosh Varshney laments the fact that poor democracies do 
not seem to have an inherent advantage in their being democracies to tackle 
poverty28 and offers an important and useful explanation for why this is so. Dis-
tinguishing between class and ethnicity, where class is essentially an economic 
category, but ethnicity is defined in terms of ascriptive identities, Varshney ar-
gues that the ethnic politics of subaltern groups are not normally framed in terms 
of poverty. In a multi-ethnic democracy, Varshney posits that political mobiliza-
tion tends to happen along ethnic fault lines rather than economic or class issues. 
Hence, if the poor belong to very different groups, defined by caste, language, 
race, religion, then the likelihood of collective action converging solely around 
an agenda of poverty-removal is unlikely. This, combined with the fact that de-
mocracies tend to favour direct and more popular methods of poverty removal, 
has led to the country’s sustained disappointing results. Furthermore, while 
agreeing with Sen that democracy cuts down the worst excesses of poverty such 
as famines, Varshney has pointed out that it creates clienteles around interven-
tionist-direct action policies.29 
 
  
  
As seen from the above theoretical, empirical and methodological overview, 
every measurement of poverty in India has its specific politics behind it. The 
intent of the paper has been to argue that poverty-alleviation is a policy issue 
that inevitably involves a politics-policy nexus. Extending the statistical data 
from the World Bank and other international agencies for cross-cultural compar-
ison need to take into account the value premises (liberal, institutionalism, dem-
ocratic legitimacy as based on entitlement) on which the data are based. Sen for 
example, while emphasizing quantitative measures, leaves open the scope for 
subjective attributes such as legitimacy. In fact, from survey research30 one 
comes up with inexplicable evidence of a sense of qualified optimism, even 
among the poor. This would be explained by the neo-institutional model in Fig-
ure 1 that refers to the fact that perception is a key variable in the dynamic mod-
el. Such a finding, it is argued is not mere evidence of the efficacy of democratic 
rhetoric and confirmation of the low expectations, karma-bound, fatalistic Indi-
ans? Rather, it is posited that there is something seriously wrong with the left-
leaning, structural-reformist approaches to poverty research that pervades the 
field, especially when it comes to the case of India. These perspectives tend to 
overlook the flexibility and resilience of structures like the Indian constitution 
that are capable of bringing about changes in the rules of the game and of creat-
ing new policy arenas. 
 
The macro co-existence of poverty and plenty in a country like India, which 
has had its share of mass movements, can only be explained by disaggregating 
India. Different regions have had hugely different success rates in targeting and 
tackling poverty. However, yet another avenue that needs further exploration is 
whether liberalization and globalization can lead to poverty reduction. The state 
of Bihar may in fact be showing the way, for recent election results revealed 
voting patterns based on the government’s performance and output rather than 
caste acting as the prominent deciding factor. Furthermore, as a result of, or in 
conjunction with, this political revival, are impressive economic growth rates 
that promise to change the reputation of Bihar being one of the infamous BIM-
ARU states. The case of Bihar therefore may indeed herald a new dynamic, a 
‘race to the top’ perhaps, as states within the federal union compete for foreign 
and domestic investment and the hope of attracting both wealth and skilled la-
bour. 
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